The Myth and Reality of German Warfare

"This is a must read. With broad brush strokes, Gerhard Gross presents the scholarship of the last half century on 'the German way of war' from the Elder Moltke to Adolf Heusinger in critical yet convincing fashion, complete with stunning colored maps. His new operational history is more than bugles and drums: it is imbedded firmly in German diplomatic, economic, political, and social history. It is a continuous line of evolution. It painstakingly differentiates among tactics, operations and strategy. It is brilliant."—Holger H. Herwig, author of The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914–1918

"It is in the end a fascinating study of how those at the highest levels of the German General Staff thought in the past—and still think today."—History Net

"The book's US publisher deserves high marks for producing this solid (uncredited) translation of the 2012

German original, equipped with many high-quality maps and a substantive foreword by noted military historian Robert Citino.

Gerhard Gross has confirmed his reputation as a most perceptive practitioner of operational military history."—Michigan War Studies Review

"[Gross's] historical survey will take the reader on the examination of the operational thought of five different German armies: the Prussian army of the nineteenth century, the Kaiser's army before and after World War I, the interwar Reichswehr, Adolf Hitler's Wehrmacht, and finally, the Bundeswehr of the Cold War. The result is a fascinating study of a disastrous continuity in military thought."—Military Review

"Gross goes beyond the scope of most works on German military history by extending his discussion into the early Cold War period. The Myth and Reality of German Warfare: Operational Thinking from Moltke the Elder to Heusinger is indispensable reading for any student of the topic."—Parameters

"Gross's command of the literature, both in English and German, shines through his analysis. Skillfully argued and thoroughly researched, Gross's study demolishes the myth of German operational brilliance and exposes the limitations of maneuver warfare at the strategic level."—Journal of Military History